G & O GENERAL CONTRACTORS, INC., WAB No. 90-35 (WAB Feb. 19, 1991)
CCASE:
G & O GENERAL CONTRACTORS, INC.
DDATE:
19910219
TTEXT:
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[1] WAGE APPEALS BOARD
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
WASHINGTON, D. C.
In the Matter of:
G & O GENERAL
CONTRACTORS, INC.
GEORGE GYFTOPOULOS,
President WAB Case No. 90-35
ODISEAS GIFTOPOULOS,
Vice President
BEFORE: Ruth E. Peters, Presiding Member
Stuart Rothman, Senior Member
Patrick J. O'Brien, Member
DATED: February 19, 1991
DECISION OF THE WAGE APPEALS BOARD
This matter is before the Wage Appeals Board on the petition
of the above-captioned parties (hereinafter, collectively, "G & O"
or "Petitioner") seeking review of the Decision and Order ("D & O")
(Attached) of Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Lawrence Brenner
dated July 10, 1990. Ordinarily, this case would not warrant
review; ALJ Brenner found and Petitioner admits the following
Davis-Bacon Act violations: underpayments of over $40,000 to 32
employees on two government contracts (Petitioner's Memorandum in
Support of the Petition for Review, or "Memorandum", p. 3; D & O,
pp. 2-3); and falsification of certified payrolls (Memorandum, p.
3; D & O, p. 2 ). Although ALJ Brenner makes no mention of the
matter, Petitioner apparently [1]
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[2] underpaid employees on subsequent government contracts (Memorandum,
p. 3; Tr. 67-71); furthermore, G & O may have threatened employees
with retaliatory discharge for questioning the rates at which they were
paid (Tr. 130).
Given the absence of any significant factual disputes, the
Board could render G & O the shortness of the shrift to which it is
entitled. However, for purposes of future debarment actions, and
given the "clean" record before us, we take this opportunity to
address the length of the debarment period under the Davis-Bacon
Act.
I. DISCUSSION
The Petitioner does not question the factual determinations
of ALJ Brenner; rather, it contends that the ALJ has discretion to
deny debarment or to impose less than a three-year period of
debarment in a case arising solely under the Davis-Bacon Act, 40
U.S.C. [sec] 276a et seq., and should have allowed the introduction
of evidence on the subject. Secondly, G & O claims that it was
somehow prejudiced by unspecified "inexcusable delay" by the
Department of Labor in notifying Petitioner of the pendency of the
action and the issuance of ALJ Brenner's decision (a period during
which G & O obtained and apparently violated other government
contracts).
A. Debarment Under The Davis-Bacon Act
The terms of the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. [sec] 276a- 2(a),
are quite clear with regard to the consequences of a substantive
violation of its provisions:
. . . The Comptroller General of the United States is . . .
authorized and is directed to distribute a list to all
departments of the Government giving the names of persons or
firms whom he has [*found to have disregarded their
obligations to employees and subcontractors. No contract
shall be awarded to the persons or firms appearing on this
list . . . until three years have elapsed*] . . . .
[*(Emphasis added)*].
Thus, the Davis-Bacon Act embodies a specific "bright line"
test: if a contractor disregards obligations to employees and/or
subcontractors, that party (and its related entities) are debarred
for three years. The Act contains no language giving the
Department of Labor or the Comptroller General discretion to impose
a lesser period following the determination that a violation has
occurred. See Bob's Construction Co., Inc., WAB Case No. 87-25
(May 11, 1989); Marvin E. Hirchert d/b/a M & H Construction Co.,
WAB Case No. 77-17 (Oct. 16, 1978). Unless and until Congress
chooses to amend the Davis-Bacon [2]
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[3] Act, the Board and the ALJs have no discretion to consider or
authorize a debarment period of less than three years.
The regulations under the Davis-Bacon Related Acts do create
a possibility of a debarment period of less than three years. See
29 C.F.R. 5.12. However, this possibility is predicated upon a
demonstration of extraordinary circumstances. See A. Vento
Construction, WAB Case No. 87-51 (Oct. 17, 1990)(29 WH 1685).
In light of the clear expression of Congressional intent
regarding the period of debarment contained in the Davis-Bacon Act,
evidence regarding "mitigating factors" or "extraordinary
circumstances" is irrelevant to that issue. Accordingly, evidence
on the subject should be objected to and excluded pursuant to 29
C.F.R. 18.402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible").
We would not view an ALJ's sua sponte denial of admissibility as an
abuse of discretion.
B. "Inexcusable Delay"
As noted, it is Petitioner's claim that the duration of this
proceeding (during which they obtained additional government
contract business) was somehow prejudicial. As the Petitioner made
no showing on the record, other than unsubstantial allegations
regarding planning uncertainties, there is no basis to question ALJ
Brenner's determination. Where, as here, Petitioner was on notice
of the possibility of debarment and nonetheless obtained additional
federal contracting, we find it hard to believe a showing of
prejudice could be made.
II. DECISION
Finally, we note that this was, at its inception, a "mixed
case", involving both the Davis-Bacon Act and the Contract Work
Hours and Safety Standards Act, 40 U.S.C. [sec] 327 et seq.
("CWHSSA"). CWHSSA is addressed in the Labor Department's charging
letter and order of reference, as well as in the Solicitor's brief
to the ALJ. Nevertheless, the Decision and Order is silent as to
the CWHSSA violations. Perhaps the ALJ considered the matter moot
in light of the Davis-Bacon Act debarment, as did the Solicitor in
light of the lack of a challenge to the omission.
For future reference we would prefer that the ALJ explicitly
address all alleged violations. In an appropriate case we would
remand for specific determinations. [3]
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[4]
Senior Member Rothman, concurring
On July 10, 1990, Administrative Law Judge Lawrence Brenner
issued the decision attached hereto. G & O General Contractors,
Inc. petitioned for review and filed a supporting brief. The Wage
and Hour Administrator filed an answering brief.
After considering the decision and the record in the light of
the petition and the briefs, I would affirm the Judge's rulings,
findings and conclusions and adopt the recommended order except
that the ALJ incorrectly concluded (ALJ Decision, pp. 6-7) that the
Board "vests itself with the power to impose" a debarment of less
than three years under the Davis-Bacon Act. I note that the ALJ
decision is consonant with my concurring opinion in A. Vento
Construction, WAB Case No. 87-51 (Oct. 17, 1990)(29 WH 1685).
For the reasons stated above, ALJ Brenner's Decision and
Order is affirmed, the Petition is denied, and the request for oral
argument is denied.
BY ORDER OF THE BOARD:
Ruth E. Peters, Presiding Member
Stuart Rothman, Senior Member
Patrick J. O'Brien, Member
_____________________________
Gerald F. Krizan, Esq.
Executive Secretary [4]